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This paper examines how intellectual property rights (IPR) protection affects innovation
and foreign direct investment (FDI) using a North–South quality-ladder model incorpor-
ating the exogenous and costless imitation of technology and subsidy policies for both
R&D and FDI. We show that for the interior steady state to be stable, either R&D or FDI
subsidy rates must be positive. Our findings also indicate that strengthening IPR
protection promotes both innovation and FDI. Moreover, a strengthening of IPR protection
can also improve welfare if the initial IPR protection in the South is weak and the R&D
subsidy rate is not too high.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Since the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) was signed in the Uruguay Round,
developing countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been under pressure to adopt a set of
minimum standards on intellectual property rights (IPR). To comply with these international agreements, some developing
countries have recently strengthened their IPR protection. For example, according to the indexes in Park (2008), patent
protection in Brazil, China, and India generally strengthened between 1990 and 2005 compared with that before 1990.
This change toward strengthening IPR protection in developing countries is likely to have a great impact on innovation
and foreign direct investment (FDI) in these countries for several reasons. For example, strengthening IPR protection in a
developing country makes it difficult for local firms to copy products developed by other firms and decreases the risk of
technology imitation in that country. Thus, strengthening IPR protection is likely to influence the decision of a firm with
advanced technology on whether to transfer production to a developing country. In addition, a decrease in imitation
changes the monopolistic rent that the inventor of a good can earn, which is likely to influence R&D activities by firms in
developed countries.
The present paper theoretically investigates the impact of strengthening IPR protection in developing countries using a
dynamic general equilibriummodel with two countries: the North, where new technology is invented, and the South, whereer B.V.
ax: þ81 6 6850 5274.
iwaisako@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp (T. Iwaisako).
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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results. First, strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the wage in the South relative to that in the North.
Second, strengthening IPR protection increases innovation in the North and the flow of FDI from the North to the South in
both the long and the short run. Third, strengthening IPR protection can improve the welfare of both Southern and Northern
households if the initial IPR protection in the South is sufficiently weak and the R&D subsidy rate is not too high.
A number of theoretical studies on technology transfer have examined the influence of strengthening IPR protection
using North–South dynamic general equilibrium models where the chosen channel for technology transfer is FDI. However,
these studies are divided based on the results. For example, two of the most important studies in this field, Lai (1998) and
Glass and Saggi (2002), obtained contrasting results. Lai (1998), using a model of variety-expanding-type innovation,
concluded that strengthening IPR protection promotes both innovation and FDI, whereas Glass and Saggi (2002), using a
model of quality-improvement-type innovation, suggested the opposite. In related work, Glass and Wu (2007) (hereafter
G–W) introduced costless imitation, as did Lai (1998), into a quality-improvement-type R&Dmodel similar to that of Glass and
Saggi (2002), and examined how increasing the probability of imitation affects innovation and FDI. Their results showed that
strengthening IPR protection impedes both innovation and FDI. This finding lies contrary to Lai (1998) but is similar to that in
Glass and Saggi (2002). By comparing the settings and results in these papers, G–W (2007) surmised that we could attribute
the different results in Lai (1998) and Glass and Saggi (2002) to whether innovation is variety expanding or quality improving.
In this paper, we show that this presumption is not correct using a quality-ladder-type model. More specifically, the
present paper extends G–W's (2007) model by introducing selected industrial policies into the model, i.e., subsidies for R&D
and FDI, in order to reexamine the effect of strengthening IPR protection. Our model also includes the case of “inefficient
followers” from their paper as a particular case where both of these subsidies are zero. In terms of results, our model shows
that the unique interior steady state is necessarily unstable if both subsidies are zero. Hence, there is no equilibrium path
converging to the interior steady state in the case of zero subsidies. In that case, following a policy change, the economy
must move toward a “corner-solution equilibrium” in which some endogenous variables are zero. This result implies that
the conclusion on IPR protection in G–W's (2007) inefficient followers' case needs to be reexamined because we cannot
apply comparative statics of the steady state to the evaluation of a policy change. To address this issue, we prove that the
unique steady state can be stable and comparative statics are applicable if the subsidy rates are higher than some critical
level. Our model shows that if the interior steady state is stable, strengthening IPR protection necessarily promotes both
innovation and FDI. This central conclusion is the opposite of the result in G–W (2007) and the same as that of the variety-
expanding-type model in Lai (1998). Thus, our result proposes a counterexample to G–W's (2007) conjecture that whether
strengthening IPR protection promotes innovation and FDI depends on the type of innovation.
As a more important topic, we also explore the welfare effects of strengthening IPR protection. Many earlier studies in
this area, including Lai (1998), Glass and Saggi (2002), and G–W (2007), did not analyze the welfare effects because they
focused on the effects on innovation and FDI. However, we cannot draw conclusions about the desirability of IPR policies
based only on their effects on innovation and FDI. Our welfare analysis shows that strengthening IPR protection in the South
entails simultaneous dynamic and static effects on welfare. The former dynamic effect arises from promoting innovation. An
increase in innovation then enables households to consume higher-quality goods over time and increases their welfare. But
strengthening IPR protection also accounts for static effects through changing the number of imitated goods and the income
of households. As the imitator firms produce the imitated goods competitively, they sell at a lower price than the other
goods produced monopolistically under the patents. Therefore, strengthening IPR protection may reduce welfare through
decreasing imitation and the number of cheaper goods. In addition, it may affect welfare through changing the wages and
the values of shares owned by households. To evaluate the desirability of IPR policies, we then need to compare the sizes of
the dynamic effects with those of the static effects. In this paper, we show that the dynamic effects outweigh the static
effects if the initial IPR protection is sufficiently weak and the rate of R&D subsidy is not too high. This implies that stronger
protection of IPR can improve the welfare of the South and the North.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we derive the
equilibrium path of this model. In Sections 4 and 5, we show that strengthening IPR protection promotes both innovation
and FDI. Section 6 shows that strengthening IPR protection can improve welfare. In Section 7, we discuss the welfare effects
of subsidy policies and the welfare effects in the model where imitation and FDI are costly processes. Section 8 provides
some concluding remarks.
2. The model
Our model has the same basic structure as that of G–W (2007), which is a version of the North–South quality-ladder
model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter 12).1 The main difference between our model and G–W (2007)1 Our model is based on the “fully endogenous” rather than the “semi-endogenous” theory of growth. The fully endogenous growth model has often
been criticized because of the “problem” of scale effects. However, Ha and Howitt (2007), for example, have argued that fully endogenous theory is more
consistent than semi-endogenous theory with the long-run data. Further, Aghion and Howitt (2006, p. 98) stated that “… there is no evidence pointing to
the absence of a scale effect at the world level or in small closed economies”. Because debate remains as to whether endogenous or semi-endogenous
theory is more appropriate, we adopt an endogenous growth model. This generally has the benefit of a simpler dynamic structure than the semi-
endogenous growth model, so we can obtain clearer results, particularly for welfare analysis.
H. Tanaka, T. Iwaisako / European Economic Review 67 (2014) 107–124 109is the existence of two subsidies, one for R&D and the other for FDI. Consider an economy consisting of two countries, the
North and the South, denoted by N and S, respectively. The population size of country iAfN; Sg is constant and given by Li.
Each agent supplies one unit of labor inelastically at each point in time tA ½0;1Þ at a wage of wiðtÞ. We choose Southern
labor as the numeraire and normalizewSðtÞ to one at any point in time t. We let w(t) denote the relative wage of the North to
the South: wðtÞ wNðtÞ=wSðtÞ ¼wNðtÞ.
In this economy, there is a continuum of goods, indexed by jA ½0;1, that are produced in the North or the South. One unit
of good output requires one unit of labor input. Each good is classified by a number of “generations” m¼0, 1, 2,…. We
normalize the generation number of every good to be zero at time t¼0. A one-step newer generation of good j becomes
available if innovation takes place in industry j as a result of successful R&D efforts by a firm. We assume that different
generations of a good have different “qualities”. The quality of good j of generation m is provided by qmðjÞ ¼ λm.
2.1. Consumers
Consumers living in country iAfN; Sg have the following lifetime utility:
Ui ¼
Z 1
0
eρt log uiðtÞ dt; ð1Þ
where ρ is a common subjective discount rate and log uiðtÞ represents the instantaneous utility at time t. We specify the
instantaneous utility function as
log uiðtÞ ¼
Z 1
0
log ∑
m
qmðjÞxi;mðj; tÞ
 
dj; ð2Þ
where xi;mðj; tÞ denotes consumption by consumers living in country i of generation m of good j at time t. The representative
consumer in country iAfN; Sg maximizes his or her lifetime utility (1) under the following budget constraint:Z 1
0
e
R t
0
rðsÞ dsEiðtÞ dt ¼ Aið0Þþ
Z 1
0
e
R t
0
rðsÞ dswiðtÞ dt
Z 1
0
e
R t
0
rðsÞ dsTiðtÞ dt;
where r(t) is the interest rate that consumers in both countries face at time t, Aið0Þ is the initial asset holdings of a consumer
in country i, and TiðtÞ is a lump-sum tax levied by the government of country i. The term EiðtÞ represents the flow of
expenditure by a consumer in country iAfN; Sg at time t, namely
EiðtÞ ¼
Z 1
0
∑
m
pmðj; tÞxi;mðj; tÞ
 
dj;
where pmðj; tÞ is the price of generation m of good j at time t.
We can solve this consumer's utility maximization problem in two stages. First, for each product, the consumer chooses
the single generation ~mðj; tÞ that carries the lowest quality-adjusted price pmðj; tÞ=qmðjÞ. This implies the following static
demand function:
xi;mðj; tÞ ¼
EiðtÞ=pmðj; tÞ for m¼ ~mðj; tÞ;
0 otherwise:
(
ð3Þ
Second, intertemporal utility maximization requires that _EiðtÞ=EiðtÞ ¼ rðtÞρ. Therefore, aggregate world expenditure,
EðtÞ  LNENðtÞþLSESðtÞ, also changes over time according to the following condition:
_EðtÞ
EðtÞ ¼ r tð Þρ: ð4Þ
2.2. Production
In this model, we can classify firms into two types: “leaders”, which are firms that developed the current latest
generation of each good, and “followers”, which are firms other than the leaders. These firms are located in the North or the
South. Regardless of location, a firm can freely sell its good in both countries without incurring any transportation costs or
tariffs. We assume that only Northern firms have the ability to undertake R&D and bring about innovation. If a Northern firm
succeeds in developing a newer generation of good j, the firm can patent that generation of good j in the North and
monopolistically sell the patented good until it is imitated. Hereafter, we refer to the leader producing a latest-generation
good in the North as a “Northern leader”.
A Northern leader can become a “multinational” firm by shifting production to the South through FDI. By becoming a
multinational firm, the firm can employ cheaper Southern labor for production. However, a multinational firm faces the risk
of imitation by Southern followers because IPR protection is not perfect in the South. Once imitation takes place in industry j,
the process for making the current latest generation of good j is completely revealed and perfect competition prevails in the
industry until the next generation is developed. The imitated good is sold at wSðtÞ ¼ 1 in both countries and the multinational
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leader.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), a monopolistic leader (which refers to a leader whose good has not yet been
imitated) can maximize profits by pricing its good at the upper limit of the prices such that rival firms are unable to operate.
As described in Section 2.3, we focus on the case where innovation takes place only in industries in which the current latest
generation has already been copied. In this case, the strongest rivals of each monopolistic leader are the Southern followers
that have the ability to produce the second-highest quality of each good, which could cut the price to the marginal cost,
wSðtÞ ¼ 1. Because a monopolistic leader needs to set the lowest quality-adjusted price to eliminate rivals from its market,
the optimal price for each Northern leader and multinational firm is the marginal cost of the rivals multiplied by the degree
of advantage in quality: p¼ λ wSðtÞ ¼ λ. This price setting and the demand function imply that the sales of a monopolistic
leader are EðtÞ=λ. Therefore, the flow of profits for a Northern leader is
πN tð Þ ¼ λwN tð Þð Þ
EðtÞ
λ
¼ 1 wðtÞ
λ
 
E tð Þ: ð5Þ
Likewise, the flow of profits for a multinational firm is
πF tð Þ ¼ 1þsFð Þ λwS tð Þð Þ
EðtÞ
λ
¼ 1þsFð Þ 1
1
λ
 
E tð Þ; ð6Þ
where sFZ0 is the rate of FDI subsidy. That is, the Southern government pays each multinational firm 100 sF percent of
profits as “FDI subsidies”.2 Note that sF is assumed to be zero in G–W's (2007) model.
2.3. R&D and FDI
We make the same two assumptions as G–W (2007) to focus on the case where no R&D is undertaken in industries
where a Northern leader or a multinational firm produces a good. First, the labor input required for one unit of R&D by
followers is sufficiently larger than that for the leader of the industry. This first assumption ensures that only leaders
undertake R&D. G–W (2007) referred to this situation as the case of “inefficient followers” because the R&D productivity of
followers is relatively low. Second, no leader has an incentive to further research its own good until the good has been
imitated.3 Under these two assumptions, only the leader firm that made the previous innovation for the good undertakes
R&D after the good has been imitated.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that the success or failure of R&D follows a Poisson process: specifically,
if the leader firm of industry j devotes aNιNðtÞ dt units of Northern labor for a time interval of length dt to research on good j,
it succeeds in developing the next generation of good j with probability ιNðtÞ dt. We refer to ιNðtÞ as “innovation intensity”. A
leader firm whose good has been imitated chooses ιNðtÞ to maximize expected net gains from R&D. If a firm succeeds in
innovation by R&D, it obtains vNðtÞ, which denotes the market value of a Northern leader. Meanwhile, R&D costs
wNðtÞaNιNðtÞ dt for the wage payments. Thus, the expected net gains from R&D are ½vNðtÞð1sRÞwNðtÞaNιNðtÞ dt, where
sRA ½0;1Þ denotes the rate of R&D subsidy. That is, the Northern government bears 100 sR percent of the R&D cost as
subsidies. Note that G–W's (2007) model corresponds to the case of sR¼0 in our model. Because R&D activities have to be of
positive but finite size, the following zero-profit condition on R&D must be satisfied:
vNðtÞ ¼ ð1sRÞwðtÞaN : ð7Þ
Following G–W (2007), we assume that a Northern leader can become a multinational firm instantaneously without cost.
Under this assumption, a Northern leader firm must be indifferent as to whether it becomes a multinational firm or
continues production only in the North. Thus, the following equality must hold at each point of time:
vNðtÞ ¼ vF ðtÞ; ð8Þ
where vF ðtÞ is the market value of a multinational firm whose good has not yet been imitated.
Arbitrage between assets requires that a stock of a leader firm yields the same expected rate of return as the risk-free
interest rate, r(t). Thus, in equilibrium, the following no-arbitrage condition between the risk-free asset and the stock of a
Northern leader is satisfied:
rðtÞvNðtÞ ¼ πNðtÞþ _vNðtÞ; ð9Þ
where the right-hand side is the return from holding the stock of a Northern leader and is equal to the sum of dividends and
capital gains. Meanwhile, the shareholders of a multinational firm face the risk of imitation. If imitation takes place in
industry j, the multinational firm in the industry loses its monopoly rents. Following Lai (1998) and G–W (2007), we assume
that every multinational firm is equally exposed to the risk of imitation at an exogenous rate Mð40Þ that depends on IPR
protection in the South. Thus, the shareholders of a multinational firm suffer a capital loss of amount vF ðtÞ at rate M.2 In reality, we can consider that the governments of some developing countries provide a “subsidy” in the form of tax incentives, including partial
exemption from corporate taxes, to the FDI of multinational firms. See, for example, UNCTAD (2001) for a broad survey of the tax incentives governments in
developing countries use to promote FDI.
3 In equilibrium, this assumption is satisfied if the quality increment by innovation, λ, is sufficiently large.
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satisfied in equilibrium:
rðtÞvF ðtÞ ¼ πF ðtÞþ _vF ðtÞMvF ðtÞ; ð10Þ
where the right-hand side is the return from holding multinational firm stock.
2.4. Type of industry
In this model, we classify every industry into the following three categories: (i) “type-N” industries where the Northern
leader firm monopolistically produces the good; (ii) “type-F” industries where the multinational firm monopolistically
produces the good; and (iii) “type-S” industries where Southern imitator firms produce the good under perfect competition.
We represent the measure (number) of industries belonging to each category by nNðtÞ, nF ðtÞ, and nSðtÞ. The sum of the
measure of all industries is equal to one, so that nNðtÞþnF ðtÞþnSðtÞ ¼ 1.
Hereafter, we focus only on the equilibrium such that all industries in the same category are symmetric. In this
equilibrium, innovation intensity ιNðtÞ takes a common value in every type-S industry. Because all innovation takes place in
type-S industries, the measure of industries in which innovation takes place in a time interval of length dt is given by ιðtÞ dt,
where ιðtÞ  ιNðtÞnSðtÞ is the “aggregate rate of innovation” in the economy as a whole. These industries change the state from
type-S to type-N in this time interval by successful innovation. Meanwhile, the measure of type-F industries in which
imitation takes place is MnF ðtÞ dt. These industries change the state from type-F to type-S in this time interval by successful
imitation. Therefore, the value of nSðtÞ changes over time with the following equation of motion:
_nSðtÞ ¼MnF ðtÞ ιðtÞ: ð11Þ
The values of nNðtÞ and nF ðtÞ are determined at each point in time between 0 and 1nSðtÞ depending on the Northern leader
firms’ location choices.
2.5. Labor market
Multinational and imitator firms employ Southern labor in the production of goods. Therefore, the labor market-clearing
condition in the South is
nF tð Þ
EðtÞ
λ
þnS tð ÞE tð Þ ¼ LS: ð12Þ
Northern labor is devoted to R&D and production. Each leader firm whose good has been imitated undertakes R&D with
intensity ιNðtÞ, so that the labor demand for R&D is given by aNιNðtÞnSðtÞ. Therefore, the labor market-clearing condition in
the North is
aN ι tð ÞþnN tð Þ
EðtÞ
λ
¼ LN : ð13Þ
2.6. Government budget constraints
In this economy, the Northern and Southern governments subsidize R&D activities and multinational production,
respectively. For simplicity, suppose that at each point in time each government runs a balanced budget where it finances its
total subsidy payments with lump-sum taxes levied on each country's consumers. To achieve a balanced budget, the
following constraints must be satisfied in both countries: sF 11=λ
 
EðtÞnF ðtÞ ¼ LSTSðtÞ and sRwðtÞaNιðtÞ ¼ LNTNðtÞ, where
the left-hand sides are the total payments of subsidies by both governments and the right-hand sides are the tax revenues.
The governments determine taxation Ti(t) such that these budget constraints are satisfied.
3. Market equilibrium path
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium path of the economy. The detailed derivation of the results in this section
is given in Appendix A. In the following parts of the paper, we focus only on the interior equilibrium in which the aggregate
rate of innovation is strictly positive and there are all types (type-N, type-F, and type-S) of industries at any time. Hereafter,
let variables with an upper bar, e.g., E , denote the steady-state values of the corresponding variables.
On the equilibrium path of this model, some endogenous variables become constant by jumping to their steady-state
values immediately at the initial time. In particular, EðtÞ and wðtÞ respectively take the following constant values for all t in
the equilibrium:
E ¼ aNλð1sRÞ½ρþMλρsF ðλ1Þð1þsF Þðλ1Þ
; ð14Þ
H. Tanaka, T. Iwaisako / European Economic Review 67 (2014) 107–124112w ¼ ρþMλρsF ðλ1Þ
ρþM : ð15Þ
We assume that w is greater than 1 because sF is sufficiently small such that sFoM=ρ. As the values of E(t) and w(t) are
constant, r(t), vNðtÞ, and vF ðtÞ also become constant for all t on the equilibrium path. Eq. (4) implies that rðtÞ ¼ ρ for all t.
In the steady state of the model, nSðtÞ, nNðtÞ, nF ðtÞ, and ιðtÞ also take constant values. The steady-state values of nSðtÞ, nNðtÞ,
and nF ðtÞ are given by
nS ¼
aNMλ2LSþE2λðLNþLSÞE
½aNMλ2ðλ1ÞEE
; ð16Þ
nF ¼
λðLSþλLNEÞ
aNMλ2ðλ1ÞE
; ð17Þ
nN ¼
λ½aNMλðELSÞLNEðλ1Þ
½aNMλ2ðλ1ÞE E
: ð18Þ
These values must be positive if there is an interior steady state in the model. The aggregate rate of innovation ιðtÞ is
determined by the value of nSðtÞ as follows:
ι tð Þ ¼ 1
aN
LNþLS
E
λ
1þ λ1ð ÞnS tð Þ½ 
( )
: ð19Þ
However, nSðtÞ, nNðtÞ, nF ðtÞ, and ιðtÞ cannot jump to their steady-state values immediately at the initial time because nSðtÞ
is a state variable whose value is historically given, and nNðtÞ, nF ðtÞ, ιðtÞ are determined depending on the value of nSðtÞ. The
equation of motion of nSðtÞ is
_nS tð Þ ¼
aNMλ2LSþE
2λðLNþLSÞE
aNλE
μnS tð Þ; ð20Þ
where E is given by (14) and μMλðλ1ÞE=ðaNλÞ ¼Mλð1sRÞ½ρþMλρsF ðλ1Þ=ð1þsF Þ is the speed of convergence to
(divergence from) the steady state if μ40 (μo0). Note that this equation of motion is a linear function of nSðtÞ and depends
only on the values of nSðtÞ itself and the exogenous variables. We solve the linear differential equation (20) as
nS tð Þ ¼
nSþðnSð0ÞnSÞeμt for μa0;
nS 0ð ÞþaNMλ
2LSþE
2 λðLN þLSÞE
aNλE
t for μ¼ 0;
8<
: ð21Þ
where nSð0Þ denotes the initial value of nSðtÞ. Because nSðtÞ is not jumpable, (21) implies that μ must be strictly positive so
that the steady state can be attained; otherwise, nSðtÞ can never take the value of the interior steady state given by (16),
except in the special case where nSð0Þ ¼ nS. Likewise, nF ðtÞ and nNðtÞ approach respectively the steady-state values of (17)
and (18) over time if and only if μ40 because the values of both variables depend on nSðtÞ. In this sense, the interior steady
state of the model becomes unstable if μ is negative. We summarize this result as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that there exists a unique steady state in which nS, nF , nN , and ι are all positive. Then the economy
approaches the steady state over time if and only if μ is positive.
Proposition 1 shows that the key to the stability of the steady state is the sign of μ, being the coefficient of the equation of
motion of nSðtÞ. Intuitively, we can interpret what determines the value of μ and the stability of the steady state by Eq. (11).
Other things being equal, an increase in nS reduces the inflow into nS (the first term in (11)) because it reduces the targets of
imitation, nF, by the Southern labor constraint. This first effect is represented by the first term in the definition of μ.
Meanwhile, other things being equal, an increase in nS also reduces the outflow from nS (the second term in (11)) because it
reduces ι.4 This second effect is represented by the second term in the definition of μ. If the former effect outweighs the
latter, μ becomes positive. In this case, a change in nS decelerates over time and the economy asymptotically approaches the
steady state. If the latter effect outweighs the former, μ becomes negative. In this case, a change in nS accelerates over time
and the economy moves away from the steady state.
We hereafter assume that μ40 so that the interior steady state is attainable.5 Meanwhile, by the definition of μ, we can
immediately prove the following corollary.4 This is shown in Eq. (19). Because a type-S industry employs more labor than a type-F industry, the labor constraint in the South requires that an
increase in nS must reduce nSþnF by sharply decreasing nF. Thus, an increase in nS increases the measure of industries producing in the North,
nN ¼ 1ðnSþnF Þ, and thereby decreases the labor devoted to R&D in terms of the labor constraint in the North. This is why ι decreases with nS.
5 If λ is sufficiently large, this condition is not very restrictive. For instance, following Glass and Saggi (2002), we use ρ¼ 0:05, λ¼ 4, LN¼3, and LS¼6 as
a numerical example. We further set M¼0.037, aN¼123.5, and sF¼0.2. In this case, the interior steady state exists and is stable if 0:220osRo0:487, which
does not appear a very narrow range.
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the model is unstable.
This corollary implies that the economy in the case of the inefficient followers in G–W (2007), which corresponds to the specific
case of sR ¼ sF ¼ 0 in our model, does not tend to the interior steady state, except when it begins in the steady state by chance. In
particular, when the government changes a policy, such as IPR protection, the economy without subsidies no longer moves toward
the new interior steady state, even if it were originally in the interior steady state. Rather, it moves toward the “corner-solution
equilibrium” such that the values of some endogenous variables are zero over time.6 For this reason, if sR ¼ sF ¼ 0, a comparison of
the interior steady states before and after a given policy change does not enable an accurate judgment on the effect of that policy. In
this case, we should not evaluate the influence of a policy using analysis of the comparative statics. Thus, the conclusion on IPR
protection policy in G–W's (2007) inefficient followers' case should be reexamined because it draws on comparative statics.
4. Long-run effects of strengthening IPR protection
In this section, we examine the influence of strengthening IPR protection on the steady-state values of the endogenous
variables. Because we can interpret the strengthening of IPR protection in the South as a decrease in the imitation rateM, we
carry out the comparative statics with respect to M.
4.1. The effect on the relative wage
Using the comparative statics, we can find that strengthening IPR protection (a decrease in M) increases the wage in the
South relative to the North, 1=wðtÞ. Differentiating w given by (15) with respect to M, we have
∂w
∂M
¼ ð1þsF Þðλ1Þρ
ðρþMÞ2
40:
The reason why stronger IPR protection increases the Southern relative wage is as follows. To start with, the no-arbitrage
condition (10) implies that the market value of a multinational firm must equal the sum of the present value of its
instantaneous profit flow, that is, vF ¼ π F=ðρþMÞ. This relation shows that, other things being equal, strengthening IPR
protection (a decrease inM) increases vF directly. This is because the decrease in the risk of imitation enables a multinational
firm to earn instantaneous profits πF for a longer time on average by extending the expected period of monopoly. The larger
vF then provides the Northern leader firms with greater incentive to transfer production to the South. Therefore, other
things being equal, the demand for Southern labor to produce a good would increase because more Northern leader firms
would choose to convert to multinational firms. In equilibrium, the Northern (relative) wage w unambiguously falls to
increase the incentive for production in the North. We summarize this result as follows.
Proposition 2. Strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the wage in the South relative to that in the North.
4.2. The effect on innovation
How then does strengthening IPR protection affect the “long-run” aggregate rate of innovation ι ? G–W (2007) concluded that
relaxing IPR protection (an increase inM) increases the aggregate rate of innovation in the case of inefficient followers. However,
our model shows that this conclusion is not true in the parameter ranges where the interior steady state becomes stable. In fact,
differentiating (19) with respect to M and evaluating the steady-state value, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the long-run aggregate rate of innovation.
Proof. See Appendix B.
How does stronger IPR protection promote innovation in our model? Intuitively, it is useful to recall the Northern labor
market-clearing condition (13). This condition requires that the sum of the labor inputs into R&D and production by the
Northern leaders must be equal to the constant Northern labor supply. Accordingly, the lower the labor input into
production by the Northern leaders, the more abundant the labor input into R&D. In our model, strengthening IPR
protection decreases the labor input for production by Northern leaders through the following channels. The first channel is
through a decrease in aggregate spending E . By differentiating E given by (14) with respect toM, the effect of strengthening
IPR protection (a decrease in M) on E proves to be negative as follows:
∂E
∂M
¼ aNλ
2ð1sRÞ
ð1þsF Þðλ1Þ
40:
Because the decrease in aggregate spending E reduces the demand for goods produced by Northern leaders, each Northern
leader decreases the labor input for production. The second channel is through a decrease in the measure of type-N6 More specifically, if nSð0Þ is greater than nS , then nSðtÞ gradually increases and either innovation or FDI becomes zero at finite time. If nSð0Þ is smaller
than nS , then nSðtÞ gradually decreases and either nSðtÞ or nN ðtÞ becomes zero at finite time.
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IPR protection decreases the number of Northern patent holders that choose to operate in the North. By differentiating (18)
with respect to M, we can verify this as follows:
∂nN
∂M
¼ 1
μ
λ1ð ÞnFþ
MλLS
E
2 þ
ðλ1ÞnN
aNλ
" #
∂E
∂M
( )
40: ð22Þ
The fewer leaders operating in the North mean less use of Northern labor for production. Because both these effects
decrease the labor input for production, strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the labor input for R&D and
thereby promotes innovation.
Note that the conclusion of Proposition 3 is completely opposite to that of the inefficient followers' case in G–W (2007).
Why does the result of our model differ from that of G–W (2007)? The main reason is the stability of the steady state in the
model. Recall that we restrict the parameter ranges so that the steady state becomes stable. As discussed in Section 3, at
least μ must be positive if the steady state is stable. Because μ is positive, we find that nN increases with the rate of imitation
M from (22). As a result, we can draw the conclusion that strengthening IPR protection unambiguously decreases the labor
input for production in the North. However, in G–W's (2007) model, the steady state is unstable and the value of μ is
negative. Therefore, from (22), nN must be decreasing with the rate of imitationM. This means that the strengthening of IPR
protection in their model necessarily increases the number of leader firms operating in the North (see also Eq. 29 in G–W,
2007). Because the sign of the abovementioned second channel lies opposite to that of our model, strengthening IPR
protection can increase the labor input for production in the North. In fact, the negative effect of the latter channel
outweighs the positive effect of the former, so that strengthening IPR protection decreases the labor input for R&D and the
aggregate rate of innovation in G–W's (2007) model.
The result of Proposition 3 is similar to that obtained with variety-expanding-type innovation models including an exogenous
process of imitation in the South, such as in Lai (1998). However, our result is contrary to Mondal and Gupta (2008) who
employed a variety-expanding-type innovation model including an endogenous process of imitation in the South, unlike Lai
(1998) and the present paper. Mondal and Gupta (2008) showed that strengthening IPR protection impedes innovation.
4.3. The effect on FDI
Strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the measure of type-F industries as well as the aggregate rate of
innovation. By differentiating (17) with respect to M, we have
∂nF
∂M
¼  1
μ
λnFþ
ð1nF ÞλþnF
aNλ
∂E
∂M
" #
o0: ð23Þ
We summarize this result as the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Strengthening IPR protection in the South increases FDI in the long run.
By using the equation of motion of nSðtÞ, we obtain an interpretation of Proposition 4. From (11), the value of nF is given
by the ratio of the aggregate rate of innovation to the imitation rate, ι=M, in the steady state. Because strengthening IPR
protection decreases the imitation rate M while increasing the aggregate rate of innovation ι, it necessarily increases the
measure of type-F industries nF .
The result of Proposition 4 is also contrary to the conclusion of G–W's (2007) inefficient followers' case. G–W (2007)
concluded that a decrease in M necessarily decreases nF . However, our model shows that a decrease in M necessarily
increases nF from (23) because μ is positive. The difference in the result of our model and that of G–W (2007) is also
attributable to the difference in the stability of the steady states in the two models. Recall that under G–W's (2007) setting,
strengthening IPR protection decreases the aggregate rate of innovation because the value of μ is negative, unlike in our
model. As nF is equal to ι=M in both models, strengthening IPR protection influences nF through two channels: the first is a
direct effect through the decrease in the imitation rate, and the second is an indirect effect through the decrease in the
aggregate rate of innovation. The former has a positive effect, whereas the latter has a negative effect on the value of nF in
their model. Because the latter indirect effect is sufficient to outweigh the former direct effect in their model, strengthening
IPR protection decreases nF . Note that this conclusion in G–W (2007) crucially depends on the result that ι is increasing with
M under their setting. The reason why ι is increasing with M is the instability of the steady state of their model. Thus, their
result on the effect of a change in M on nF also arises from the lack of stability of the steady state.
The result of Proposition 4 accords with that in some of the literature. Lai (1998) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011),
who assumed variety-expanding type of innovation, also concluded that strengthening IPR protection in the South increases
technology transfer to the South within multinational firms. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) obtained the same result by
using a quality-improvement-type innovation model that exhibits scale-invariant growth such as Segerstrom (1998), Li
(2003), and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007). However, there are a few exceptions, including Glass and Saggi (2002) and
Mondal and Gupta (2008), both of which assumed an endogenous process of imitation. Contrary to our findings, they
showed that strengthening IPR protection in the South impedes FDI.
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In Section 4, we concluded that strengthening IPR protection positively affects the aggregate rate of innovation and FDI in
the long run by comparing the steady-state values before and after the policy change. However, it is also important to
explore how strengthening IPR protection influences the aggregate rate of innovation and FDI on the transitional path to the
new steady state. Unlike many existing studies in this literature, we can investigate this, so to speak, “short-run” effect of
strengthening IPR protection because the transitional dynamics are explicitly analyzed in our model.7
Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady state and the Southern government strengthens IPR protection at the
initial time. We define the short-run effects of strengthening IPR protection as the magnitudes of ∂ιðtÞ=∂M and ∂nF ðtÞ=∂M for
any tA ½0;1Þ. Note that ∂ιðtÞ=∂M and ∂nF ðtÞ=∂M are not necessarily equal to ∂ι=∂M and ∂nF=∂M respectively because our
model includes the transitional process to the steady state. If ∂ιðtÞ=∂M and ∂nF ðtÞ=∂M are negative for all tA ½0;1Þ, we can
conclude that innovation and FDI are promoted at any point in time after strengthening IPR protection. On this short-run
effect, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady state. Then, strengthening IPR protection in the South increases
innovation and FDI for all tA ½0;1Þ.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 5 shows that ∂ιðtÞ=∂Mo0 and ∂nF ðtÞ=∂Mo0 for all t. It therefore implies that both innovation and FDI
necessarily increase, even on the transitional path, after strengthening IPR protection. That is, strengthening IPR protection
promotes innovation and FDI not only in the long run, but also in the short run. Proposition 5 shows that the result of the
short-run analysis is the same as that of the long-run analysis. Thus, it reinforces our conclusion regarding the effect of IPR
protection.
6. Welfare analysis
In Sections 4 and 5, we showed that strengthening IPR protection enhances innovation and FDI in both the long and the
short run. However, we should judge a policy's desirability by how it affects welfare. In this section, we examine the welfare
effects of IPR protection with the results obtained in Section 5. By considering the short-run welfare effect, we can examine
how a marginal increase in M, that is, relaxing IPR protection in the South, affects welfare.
To conduct the welfare analysis, we first consider the instantaneous utility function. Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain
the utility level of a consumer in country i at time t as follows: log uiðtÞ ¼ ðlog λÞ
R 1
0
~mðj; tÞ djþ R 10 log xiðj; tÞ dj, where xiðj; tÞ
denotes the quantity demanded for the current latest generation of good j at time t. The first term in this equation
represents the welfare brought by the qualities of all goods consumed. Because ~mðj; tÞ equals the current state-of-the-art
generation number of good j at time t,
R 1
0
~mðj; tÞ dj in the first term is equal to the aggregate number of innovations brought
in the interval from time 0 to time t. Thus, the first term can be replaced with ðlog λÞ R t0 ιðτÞ dτ. This means that welfare
positively depends on the aggregate rate of innovation, ιðtÞ. The second term in the instantaneous utility function represents
the welfare brought by the quantities of all goods consumed. Substituting (3) into the second term, we can rewrite the term
as log EiðtÞ
R 1
0 log pðj; tÞ dj, which means that welfare depends positively on total spending, EiðtÞ, and negatively on the
prices of the state-of-the-art goods, pðj; tÞ. The price of type-S goods is equal to one because of competition, whereas the
price of the goods other than type-S is λ (41) because the monopolistic leaders supply them. Therefore, the part of welfare
that depends on the prices reduces to
R 1
0 log pðj; tÞ dj¼ nSðtÞ log 1þð1nSðtÞÞ log λ¼ ð1nSðtÞÞ log λ, which depends on the
measure of type-S industries. An increase in the measure of type-S industries lowers the prices of goods and improves the
welfare of consumers. Considering these results, we can rewrite instantaneous utility as
log uiðtÞ ¼ ðlog λÞ
Z t
0
ιðτÞ dτþ log EiðtÞð1nSðtÞÞ log λ:
By differentiating the lifetime utility function with respect to M, we obtain the change of welfare from the marginal
increase in M as follows:
∂Ui
∂M
¼
Z 1
0
eρt log λð Þ ∂
∂M
Z t
0
ιðτÞ dτ
 
dt|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
innovationimpeding effect
ð–Þ
þ 1
ρ
1
Ei
∂Ei
∂M|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
nominalspending effect
ðambiguousÞ
þ
Z 1
0
eρt log λð Þ ∂nSðtÞ
∂M
dt|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
competition effect
ðambiguousÞ
: ð24Þ
Eq. (24) shows that the total welfare effect of relaxing IPR protection (an increase in M) can be decomposed into the
following three parts.7 Most North–South innovation models tend to have a complicated dynamic structure and so are unable to analytically examine the transition of the
equilibrium paths. The exceptions are Helpman (1993), Arnold (2002) (which is based on Helpman, 1993), and Tanaka et al. (2007). These studies analyzed
the transition of the equilibrium path by employing a relatively simple dynamic structure in their models.
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increase in the imitation rate necessarily reduces the aggregate rate of innovation for all t. We refer to the welfare effect
through this channel as the innovation-impeding effect. In the remainder of the analysis, we assume that the economy is
initially in the steady state, namely nSð0Þ ¼ nS. Under this assumption, we derive the innovation-impeding effect from the
results in Appendix C as follows:Z 1
0
eρt log λð Þ ∂
∂M
Z t
0
ιðτÞ dτ
 
dt ¼ log λð Þ μ
ρ2ðρþμÞ
∂ι
∂M
 1
aNλρðρþμÞ
1þðλ1ÞnS½ 
∂E
∂M
( )
o0; ð25Þ
which is necessarily negative because an increase in M reduces ι and increases E .
Second, relaxing IPR protection may affect nominal spending and welfare. We refer to this effect as the nominal-spending
effect. Only these nominal-spending effects differ between the South and the North.
Finally, relaxing IPR protection affects the measure of type-S industries, nS(t). An increase in the measure of type-S
industries where the price is lower improves welfare. We refer to this welfare effect as the competition effect. Using the
results of the analysis of the short-run effect in Appendix C, we can compute the competition effect as follows:Z 1
0
eρt log λð Þ ∂nSðtÞ
∂M
dt ¼ log λð Þ μ
ρðρþμÞ
∂nS
∂M
: ð26Þ
The sign of the competition effect is indeterminate because the sign of ∂nS=∂M is ambiguous.
6.1. The effect on welfare in the South
We now examine whether strengthening IPR protection in the South can increase welfare in the South. In Sections 6.1
and 6.2, we focus on the case where Southern households initially possess no assets. Further, we assume no subsidy for FDI,
sF¼0, in order to make the results of the welfare analysis clearer.8 Based on these assumptions, the intertemporal budget
constraint for a Southern consumer is reduced to ES¼1, because the Southern wage is normalized to one and no tax is levied
on Southern consumers. As the nominal spending in the South, ES, is independent of M, the nominal-spending effect is
absent in the South in this case. Therefore, strengthening IPR protection in the South improves the welfare of the South if
the condition stated in the following proposition is satisfied.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady state. Strengthening IPR protection in the South then increases
the welfare of Southern consumers if M4ρsR=½λð1sRÞ.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The interpretation of the condition in Proposition 6 is somewhat complex. If relaxing IPR protection increases the
measure of type-S industries, it increases welfare through reducing prices but decreases welfare by impeding innovation.9
One of the reasons why innovation decreases is that an increase in nS reduces the labor input for R&D (see also footnote 4).
The effect of reducing R&D through the increase in nS intensifies as M is larger, sR is smaller, and λ is larger. In addition, the
innovation-impeding effect worsens if the subjective discount rate ρ is small. This is because the slowdown in quality
improvement in the future is evaluated as a heavier loss if ρ is small. Thus, if the parameters satisfy the condition given in
Proposition 6, the innovation-impeding effect becomes large enough to dominate the competition effect. Because the
nominal spending effect is equal to zero given the assumptions, strengthening (relaxing) IPR protection improves (harms)
welfare in the South.
Proposition 6 implies a desirable IPR policy in the South. Until now, earlier studies examined only whether strengthening
IPR protection enhances innovation and FDI and not whether it could improve welfare. In contrast, we can evaluate the
welfare effect of strengthening IPR protection analytically because of the tractable dynamic structure of the present model.
The result of the analysis shows that strengthening IPR protection improves welfare in the South ifM is sufficiently high and
sR is so low as to satisfy the inequality given in Proposition 6.10 In other words, we can conclude that strengthening IPR8 In Appendix G, which is available from the authors upon request, we briefly explore what happens when these assumptions are relaxed. If the
Southern households have some assets and the FDI subsidy rate is positive, the nominal spending of a Southern household is not equal to one. This implies
that the effect of relaxing IPR protection on the welfare of the South becomes more complex than is analyzed in Section 6.1 because it depends also on the
nominal spending effect. Further, through the change in the value of the assets, a tax levied in the trading partner affects income and spending in both
countries. Thus, the welfare effect of the North also becomes more complex than that analyzed in Section 6.2. However, our numerical analysis in Appendix
G indicates that the results for welfare do not change if both the subsidy rate for FDI and the share of assets held by Southern households are
sufficiently small.
9 If relaxing IPR protection decreases the measure of type-S industries, it unambiguously decreases welfare in the South through both decreasing those
goods with a lower price and impeding innovation.
10 If IPR protection is initially strong and M is sufficiently low so as not to satisfy the inequality given in Proposition 6, the effect of strengthening IPR
protection is indeterminate. In Appendix H, which is available from the authors upon request, we provide a numerical analysis of the case where the
condition of Proposition 6 is not satisfied. According to the analysis, further strengthening IPR under strong protection tends to worsen the welfare of the
South if sR is considerably large, and vice versa. Thus, the policy recommendation for the South may depend on the R&D subsidy policy of its trading
partner, namely the North. The authors appreciate the comment of an anonymous referee regarding this point.
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satisfy the condition.11
6.2. The effect on welfare in the North
Next, we analyze the welfare effect in the North. Unlike the South, nominal spending in the North, EN, depends on M.
From ES¼1 and E ¼ LNENþLSES, the nominal spending of a Northern household is derived as EN ¼ ðELSÞ=LN . An increase in
M then increases aggregate expenditure E but does not change ES, so it must increase the expenditure of a Northern
household, EN. Thus, the total welfare effect of a change in IPR protection in the North is more complex than in the South.
Nevertheless, by imposing a certain condition, we can show that strengthening IPR protection in the South improves welfare
in the North as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady state. Strengthening IPR protection in the South increases the
welfare of Northern consumers if
sRo1 1þ
ðlog λÞLS
aNλðρþMλÞ
 
λ1
λ1þ log λ :
Proof. See Appendix E. □
If the condition provided in Proposition 7 is satisfied, the innovation-impeding effect becomes large enough to dominate
the nominal spending effect and the competition effect.12 The condition tends to be satisfied if LS is relatively small. This is
because the nominal spending effect in the North is weak in that case.13 Meanwhile, the effect of λ on the condition is rather
complex. First, an increase in λ intensifies the innovation-impeding effect because a quality improvement is highly valued by
households in the case of a large λ. Second, it also changes the innovation-impeding effect through influencing E . A change
in E affects the demand for goods and thereby the labor input for production. It therefore changes the allocation of labor
resources between production and R&D, which affects the aggregate rate of innovation. Third, an increase in λ affects income
and spending in the North through changing the wage and the value of share holdings. Finally, it also intensifies the
competition effect because λ is equal to the ratio of the price of monopolistic goods to that of competitive goods. Because
these effects simultaneously arise from the change in λ, how the welfare effect of IPR depends on λ is ambiguous.
As shown in the proof, the condition in Proposition 7 is stricter than that in Proposition 6.14 Thus, when the inequality
given in Proposition 7 holds, strengthening IPR protection in the South improves welfare in both the South and the North.
This means that strengthening IPR protection in the South is a Pareto-improving policy as long as the initial protection of IPR
is sufficiently weak in the South and the rate of R&D subsidy is so low as to satisfy the inequality in Proposition 7.
6.3. Comparison with the literature
Although most of the studies in this field did not conduct a welfare analysis, there are some exceptions. For example, Helpman
(1993), Grinols and Lin (2006), and Iwaisako et al. (2011) examined the welfare effect of IPR using a growth model. In the seminal
study on IPR protection in the dynamic North–South model, Helpman (1993) conducted a welfare analysis using a variety-
expanding innovation model. He showed that stronger IPR protection necessarily harms welfare in the South. Helpman (1993)
constructed amodel including the choice of multinationalization in addition to a model where the only mode of technology transfer
is imitation. However, in his model, imitation does not affect multinationalization directly because he assumed a multinational firm
equals a Northern firm in the risk of imitation. To correct this shortcoming, some additional research was subsequently undertaken.
In contrast, Grinols and Lin (2006) showed that stronger IPR protection may improve welfare in the South by introducing a
group of goods consumed only in the South into Helpman's (1993) imitation model. Although our results on the welfare of the
South appear similar to those of Grinols and Lin (2006), the assumption concerning the channel of technology transfer differs. In
brief, our model includes FDI, whereas Grinols and Lin (2006) focused on technology transfer through the direct imitation of
Northern goods. In addition, we obtain the welfare results analytically, unlike Grinols and Lin (2006) who employed a numerical
method.11 The condition given in Proposition 6 is not so restrictive. For example, if we set ρ¼ 0:05, λ¼ 4, and sR¼0.3 as in footnote 5, the condition is satisfied
when M40:0054.
12 According to our numerical analysis, the condition given in Proposition 7 turns out to be comparatively restrictive. However, it does not mean that
stronger IPR protection tends to decrease the welfare of Northern consumers because the condition is sufficient but not necessary. Even if the condition
given in Proposition 7 is not satisfied, the welfare of the North may improve.
13 The nominal spending effect in the North is proportionate to 1=EN . Therefore, it decreases with the nominal spending of a Northern household, EN.
As the nominal spending of a Southern household is fixed to one, the small population size in the South leads to large spending in the North for a given
value of total spending in the world, E . In consequence, a small LS implies that the nominal spending effect in the North is weak.
14 From (24) and the definition of E(t), ∂UN=∂M ¼ ð∂US=∂MÞþð1=ρÞð1=EN Þð∂EN=∂MÞ and ∂EN=∂M¼ ð1=LNÞð∂E=∂MÞ40 if ES¼1. Thus, there may be a case
where stronger IPR protection is favorable for Southern consumers and unfavorable for Northern consumers. In this case, if the nominal spending effect to
welfare in the North is sufficiently large (small) relative to the sum of the innovation-impeding effect and the competition effect, the magnitude of the
decrease in the North's welfare is larger (smaller) than the magnitude of increase in the South's welfare. This is because ∂US=∂M is equal to the sum of the
innovation-impeding effect and the competition effect if ES¼1.
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South can improve welfare in the South by using a quality-improvement-type innovation model. However, the instrument
of IPR protection examined in that analysis differs from the present paper. In general, IPR authorities can control the
protection of patents using two instruments: patent length and patent breadth. The patent length refers to the duration for
which a patentee can sell the patented product monopolistically, whereas the patent breadth refers to the scope of the
products that patentees can prevent firms without patents from producing and selling. Iwaisako et al. (2011) focused on the
effects of broadening patent breadth. In the present paper, we assume that IPR authorities can control the probability of
imitation, which is associated with the expected duration of IPR. Therefore, this paper focuses on the effects of extending the
patent length rather than the patent breadth. Hence, our study and Iwaisako et al. (2011) complement each other in that the
welfare effects of strengthening IPR protection in the South are examined more completely.15
By using a model where R&D activities are undertaken in both the North and the South, Grossman and Lai (2004) also
conducted a welfare analysis. They concluded that the level of patent protection that maximizes welfare in the South tends to
be weaker than in the North. However, to obtain this result, they specified the utility function in quasilinear form and assumed
no knowledge spillovers in the R&D process. In addition, they assumed the “obsolescence” of goods; that is, a newly developed
good provides utility to consumers for only a finite length of time. These assumptions imply no growth of utility in their model.
Therefore, we cannot simply compare their results with that from a growth model including the present paper.
Furthermore, Lin (2010) conducted a welfare analysis in an extended North–South model composed of three countries. In
his model, the middle country's firms can imitate the goods invented in the North and thereafter shift production to the
South through FDI. Lin (2010) also assumed that Southern local firms might imitate the goods where production is shifted to
the South. However, the purpose of his paper was to evaluate not the welfare change of strengthening IPR protection in the
South but rather that of tightening South-bound FDI in the middle country.
7. Discussion
7.1. The welfare effects of subsidy policies
Using the same method as in Section 6, we can also investigate the welfare effects of a change in the subsidy policies.
Details of the analysis are given in Appendix I, which is available from the authors upon request. We summarize the results
as follows. First, a marginal increase in the R&D subsidy necessarily improves the welfare of the South. This is because the
effect through promoting innovation necessarily outweighs the effect through changing the proportion of imitated goods.
Second, a marginal increase in the R&D subsidy and the introduction of the FDI subsidy improve the welfare of the North if
the condition given in Proposition 7 is satisfied. Finally, introduction of the FDI subsidy improves the welfare of the South if
MλLSðMþρÞðlog λÞ=aNðλ1ÞρðρþμÞðρþMλÞ140. The reason why the second and the third results are satisfied is also that
the effect through promoting innovation is sufficiently large if the conditions are satisfied.
7.2. Costly imitation and FDI
In previous sections, we assumed that imitation is costless. However, imitation of high-technology goods involves large
costs in the real world. In addition, FDI also involves nonnegligible cost. For instance, affiliates in developing countries often
conduct R&D for the absorption of parent-firm technology, as mentioned in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) and
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2011). In this section, we introduce a few results on the effects of strengthening IPR protection
in the South in an extended model where imitation and FDI are a costly process, as in Glass and Saggi (2002). The model is
described in Appendix F and its analysis is in Appendix J, which is available from the authors upon request.
The costly imitation model shows that strengthening IPR protection (an increase in the imitation cost) tends to reduce
innovation in the North. There are some changes from the basic model and thus we cannot strictly compare the results of
the costly imitation model with those of the costless-imitation model. Nonetheless, the result is opposite to that obtained in
the costless-imitation model.16 Moreover, it is similar to the results in Mondal and Gupta (2008) using an expanding-variety
model with a costly imitation process. Thus, also in the costly imitation models, the claim in G–W (2007) that whether
strengthening IPR protection promotes innovation or not depends on whether innovation is of the variety-expansion or
quality-improving type is not correct. This difference in results suggests that the effects of strengthening IPR protection may
then depend on whether imitation is costless or costly.
The numerical results of the costly imitation model show that the relation between the strength of IPR protection and
the welfare of Southern consumers is ambiguous. Stronger IPR protection reduces welfare under a lower innovation cost,15 Using a closed-economy framework, Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Palokangas (2011) both examined the welfare effects of the patent length
and breadth. The welfare effects of other patent instruments, for example, leading and lagging patent breadths, blocking patents, and the division rule
governing profits between basic and applied researchers, have also been examined using a closed-economy framework by Li (2001), O'Donoghue and
Zweimüller (2004), Chu (2009), and Chu and Furukawa (2013).
16 We surmise the reason for this result in the costly imitation model is as follows. In the costly imitation model, strengthening IPR protection increases
the cost of imitation, and thus wastes Southern labor and crowds out FDI. The decrease in FDI then increases the production sectors in the North and
consequently reduces the innovation.
H. Tanaka, T. Iwaisako / European Economic Review 67 (2014) 107–124 119whereas it increases the welfare under higher innovation cost. When the innovation cost is lower, innovation is larger, and
thus the negative welfare effect through impeding innovation also tends to be large enough to dominate the other positive
welfare effects and vice versa.17
8. Concluding remarks
This paper examined the effects of strengthening IPR protection in developing countries using a simple North–South
quality-ladder-type R&D model where FDI is determined endogenously. We find that strengthening IPR protection promotes
innovation and FDI in both the long and the short run. This finding contrasts with the result in G–W (2007) but is identical
to that in Lai (1998), who employed a variety-expansion-type North–South model. This result is thus important not only in
the sense that it reverses the results of the comparative statics in G–W's (2007) model, but also because it shows that the
type of innovation, whether as a quality improvement or a variety expansion, does not play a key role in determining the
effects of strengthening IPR protection on innovation and FDI. Accordingly, hereafter we must examine carefully which
aspects determine the effects of IPR protection on innovation and FDI.
As a central issue, we analytically examined the welfare effect of strengthening IPR protection. We showed that the
positive welfare effect through promoting innovation dominates the other effects if the initial protection of IPR in the South
is sufficiently weak and the rate of R&D subsidy is not too high. Thus, strengthening IPR protection can increase welfare in
both the South and the North. This is important because most related studies did not evaluate the policy of strengthening
IPR protection from the viewpoint of welfare. Hence, the result of the present paper provides valuable information about
desirable IPR policies in developing countries.
In the basic model, we assumed costless imitation for tractability. In practice, imitating products involving high-level technology
can entail large costs. Thus, we need also to examine the welfare effects of strengthening IPR protection in the case where imitation
is costly. By limiting the analysis to the steady state, Section 7.2 and Appendix J examined the effects numerically. This suggests that
it is necessary hereafter to examine not only the welfare effect in the steady state but also that in the short run, as in the analysis of
the costless-imitation model. This is far beyond the scope of the present paper and thus remains as future work.
The present paper also assumes no cost of trade, such as in the form of tariffs. However, the presence of a trade cost would
certainly affect the incentives for FDI and thereby change the effects of strengthening IPR protection on FDI and innovation. By
extending the present model, we would also be able to analyze the effects of a change in trade cost as in Grieben (2005),
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2007), Grieben and Şener (2009), and Dinopoulos and Unel (2011). It is also well worth examining
how the presence of a trade cost would change the effects of strengthening IPR protection on FDI, innovation, and welfare.
Finally, as we examined the welfare effects of strengthening IPR in a model that exhibits scale effects, one direction for
future research would be to remove the scale effects from the model. However, if we extended the model in this direction,
the dynamic structure of the model would be too complex to obtain clear analytical results, obliging us to rely on numerical
analysis. Although this extension is beyond the scope of the present paper, it would be well worth conducting in the future.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A. Derivation of the equilibrium path
In this appendix, we derive the equilibrium path of the economy. From (7) and (8), the following equality is satisfied in
the equilibrium:
vNðtÞ ¼ vF ðtÞ ¼ ð1sRÞwðtÞaN : ð27Þ
Because this equality implies that _vNðtÞ ¼ _vF ðtÞ for all t, substituting (9) and (10) into the relation leads to the following
equality:
πF ðtÞπNðtÞ ¼MvF ðtÞ; ð28Þ
where the left-hand side represents the “benefit” of becoming a multinational firm for a Northern leader firm, which can be
measured by the increment in profits at each point in time, and the right-hand side represents the “cost” of becoming a
multinational firm for a Northern leader firm, which corresponds to the risk of losing its monopolistic rents through17 In the costly imitation model, we consider only the effects on the steady state and obtain the results only numerically because of the intractability of
the model. To investigate the welfare effects under costly imitation more precisely, we would need to examine the short-run welfare effects as in the
analysis of the costless-imitation model.
H. Tanaka, T. Iwaisako / European Economic Review 67 (2014) 107–124120imitation at each point in time. Substituting (5), (6), and (27) into (28), we have the following relation between E(t) and w(t):
E tð Þ ¼ aNMλð1sRÞwðtÞ
sF ðλ1ÞþwðtÞ1
; ð29Þ
which implies that
_EðtÞ
EðtÞ ¼
sF ðλ1Þ1
sF ðλ1ÞþwðtÞ1
_wðtÞ
wðtÞ : ð30Þ
Noting that _wðtÞ=wðtÞ ¼ _vNðtÞ=vNðtÞ from (7), we obtain the following equality by substituting (5), (7), and (29) into (9):
_wðtÞ
wðtÞ ¼
_vNðtÞ
vNðtÞ
¼ r tð Þ MðλwðtÞÞ
sF ðλ1ÞþwðtÞ1
; ð31Þ
where r(t) can be computed from (4), (30), and (31) as
r tð Þ ¼ sF ðλ1ÞþwðtÞ1
wðtÞ ρ
½sF ðλ1Þ1MðλwðtÞÞ
wðtÞ½sF ðλ1ÞþwðtÞ1
: ð32Þ
Substituting (32) into (31), we can derive the equation of motion of wðtÞ as follows:
_wðtÞ ¼ ðρþMÞwðtÞþρsF ðλ1ÞðρþMλÞ: ð33Þ
The only endogenous variable in this equation is w(t), which is a jumpable variable. Thus, (33) implies that w(t) must jump
to its steady-state value immediately; otherwise, w(t) would never reach the steady-state value because the coefficient of
w(t) is strictly positive. From the differential equation, the steady-state value of w(t) is given by
w ¼ ρþMλρsF ðλ1Þ
ρþM :
As w(t) takes a constant value at all times, we can show that EðtÞ, rðtÞ, vNðtÞ, and vF ðtÞ must also be constant over time.
From (29), E(t) must immediately jump to the following steady-state value:
E ¼ aNλð1sRÞ½ρþMλρsF ðλ1Þð1þsF Þðλ1Þ
:
Therefore, rðtÞ ¼ ρ is satisfied for all t because _EðtÞ=EðtÞ ¼ rðtÞρ¼ 0 at any time. In addition, (27) shows that vNðtÞ and vF ðtÞ
must also take the following constant value of the steady state for all t:
vN ¼ vF ¼
ð1sRÞaN½ρþMλρsF ðλ1Þ
ρþM :
Meanwhile, we can show that the values of nNðtÞ, nF ðtÞ, and ιðtÞ are determined depending on the value of the only state
variable in the model, nSðtÞ. By rewriting (12), we have
nF tð Þ ¼ λ
LS
E
nS tð Þ
 
: ð34Þ
Furthermore, substituting (34) into nNðtÞþnF ðtÞþnSðtÞ ¼ 1 yields
nN tð Þ ¼ 1
λLS
E
þ λ1ð ÞnS tð Þ: ð35Þ
Using (13) and (35), we can compute ιðtÞ as follows:
ι tð Þ ¼ 1
aN
LNþLS
E
λ
1þ λ1ð ÞnS tð Þ½ 
( )
: ð36Þ
By using the above results, we find that the motion of nSðtÞ in this model is determined by only the values of nSðtÞ itself
and some exogenous variables. Substituting (34) and (36) into (11), we have the following equation of motion of nSðtÞ:
_nS tð Þ ¼
aNMλ2LSþE2λðLNþLSÞE
aNλE
 Mλ ðλ1ÞE
aNλ
" #
nS tð Þ: ð37Þ
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computed from (37) as follows:
nS ¼
aNMλ2LSþE
2λðLNþLSÞE
½aNMλ2ðλ1ÞEE
: ð38Þ
Then, substituting (38) into (34) and (35) yields the steady-state values of nF ðtÞ and nNðtÞ:
nF ¼
λ½LSþλLNE
aNMλ2ðλ1ÞE
;
nN ¼
λ½aNMλðELSÞLNEðλ1Þ
½aNMλ2ðλ1ÞEE
:Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 3. It is sufficient for the proof to show that ∂ι=∂Mo0. Differentiating (19) with
respect to M, we have
∂ι
∂M
¼  1
aNλ
λ1ð ÞE ∂nS
∂M
þ 1þ λ1ð ÞnS½ 
∂E
∂M
( )
; ð39Þ
where ∂nS=∂M can be computed from (16) as follows:
∂nS
∂M
¼ nF
μ
þ 1
aNλμ
1þ λ1ð ÞnS
aNMλ2LS
E
2
" #
∂E
∂M
: ð40Þ
Substituting (40) into (39) yields
∂ι
∂M
¼  1
aNλμ
λ1ð ÞEnFþ
ðλ1ÞE
aNλ
1þ λ1ð ÞnS
aNMλ2LS
E
2
" #
∂E
∂M
(
þ aNMλ
2ðλ1ÞE
aNλ
1þ λ1ð ÞnS½ 
∂E
∂M
)
¼  1
aNλμ
λ1ð ÞEnFþMλ 1
λ1
λ
nF
 
∂E
∂M
" #
o0;
where the second equality uses the Southern labor market-clearing condition, nS ¼ LS=EnF=λ, and the last inequality uses
0onFo1. Thus, we can confirm that stronger IPR protection increases the long-run aggregate rate of innovation ι.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 5. We first show that ∂ιðtÞ=∂Mo0 for all tA ½0;1Þ if nSð0Þ ¼ nS. Differentiating (19)
with respect to M, we have
∂ιðtÞ
∂M
¼  1
aNλ
λ1ð ÞE ∂nSðtÞ
∂M
þ 1þ λ1ð ÞnS tð Þ½ 
∂E
∂M
( )
: ð41Þ
Note that ∂nSðtÞ=∂M is not necessarily equal to ∂nS=∂M. By differentiating (21) with respect to M, we can compute ∂nSðtÞ=∂M
as follows:
∂nSðtÞ
∂M
¼ 1eμt  ∂nS
∂M
teμt nS 0ð ÞnSð Þ
∂μ
∂M
: ð42Þ
If the economy is initially in the steady state and nSð0Þ ¼ nS, the second term in (42) is equal to zero. Thus, substituting (21),
(39), and (42) into (41) and applying nSð0Þ ¼ nS, we obtain the following relation:
∂ιðtÞ
∂M
nSð0Þ ¼ nS
¼  1
aNλ
λ1ð ÞE 1eμt  ∂nS
∂M
þ 1þ λ1ð ÞnS½ 
∂E
∂M
( )					
¼ 1eμt  ∂ι
∂M
 1
aNλ
1þ λ1ð ÞnS½ eμt
∂E
∂M
o0;
where the inequality holds because ∂ι=∂Mo0 and ∂E=∂M40.
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(42) and nSð0Þ ¼ nS into the derivative, we have
∂nF ðtÞ
∂M
					
nSð0Þ ¼ nS
¼ λ  LS
E
2
∂E
∂M
 ∂nSðtÞ
∂M
 !
¼ λ  LS
E
2
∂E
∂M
 1eμt  ∂nS
∂M
" #
¼ 1eμt  ∂nF
∂M
eμt λLS
E
2
∂E
∂M
o0;
where the third equality uses the relation that ∂nF=∂M¼ λ ðLS=E
2Þ∂E=∂M∂nS=∂M

 
and the inequality uses ∂nF=∂Mo0
and ∂E=∂M40.
Thus, we have been able to show that strengthening IPR protection increases innovation and FDI for all tA ½0;1Þ if
nSð0Þ ¼ nS.Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 6
In this appendix, we prove that ∂US=∂Mo0 holds whenM4ρsR=λð1sRÞ. From (24) and ES¼1, ∂US=∂M is equal to the sum of
the innovation-impeding effect and the competition effect. The sign of the competition effect depends on that of ∂nS=∂M.
If ∂nS=∂Mr0, the competition effect is nonpositive. Because the innovation-impeding effect is negative, ∂US=∂Mo0
necessarily holds if ∂nS=∂Mr0.
If ∂nS=∂M40, the competition effect is positive. Then, substituting (25), (26), and (39) into (24), we obtain a simpler
expression of the total welfare effect as follows:
∂US
∂M
¼ log λð Þ  μ
ρðρþμÞ
ðλ1ÞE
aNλρ
1
" #
∂nS
∂M
 1
aNλρ2
1þðλ1ÞnS½ 
∂E
∂M
( )
:
From this relation, even if ∂nS=∂M40, imposing ðλ1ÞE=aNλρ41 guarantees that the innovation-impeding effect outweighs
the competition effect, namely ∂US=∂Mo0. Using (14) and sF¼0, ðλ1ÞE=aNλρ41 can be reduced to M4ρsR=λð1sRÞ.Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 7
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 7. If the inequality in Proposition 7 holds, we obtain ðELSÞðlog λÞ=aNλðρþμÞ41
from (14). Therefore, we prove that ∂UN=∂Mo0 if ðELSÞðlog λÞ=aNλðρþμÞ41.
Because EN ¼ ðELSÞ=LN , the nominal spending effect in the North is given by ð1=ρðELSÞÞ∂E=∂M. Substituting these
equations, (25), and (26) into (24), the total welfare effect in the North is reduced to
∂UN
∂M
¼ log λð Þ μ
ρ2ðρþμÞ
∂ι
∂M
 1
ρðELSÞðlog λÞ
ðELSÞðlog λÞ
aNλðρþμÞ
1
" #
∂E
∂M
(
 ðλ1ÞnS
aNλρðρþμÞ
∂E
∂M
þ μ
ρðρþμÞ
∂nS
∂M
)
:
The sign of the competition effect depends on that of ∂nS=∂M.
If ∂nS=∂Mr0, the competition effect is nonpositive. From ðELSÞðlog λÞ=aNλðρþμÞ41, the second term in the curly
brackets on the right-hand side is negative. Thus, the total welfare effect is negative if ∂nS=∂Mr0.
On the other hand, if ∂nS=∂M40, the competition effect is positive. Then, from (39), we can rewrite the total welfare
effect as follows:
∂UN
∂M
¼ log λð Þ  μ
ρðρþμÞ
ðλ1ÞE
aNλρ
1
" #
∂nS
∂M
 μ
aNλρ2ðρþμÞ
1þðλ1ÞnS½ 
∂E
∂M
(
 1
ρðELSÞðlog λÞ
ðELSÞðlog λÞ
aNλðρþμÞ
1
" #
∂E
∂M
 ðλ1ÞnS
aNλρðρþμÞ
∂E
∂M
)
:
Because λ is greater than one, λ1 is greater than log λ necessarily. This implies that ðλ1ÞE=aNλρ4 ðELSÞðlog λÞ=
aNλðρþμÞ41. Therefore, the first and third terms in the curly brackets on the right-hand side are negative, and we can
confirm ∂UN=∂Mo0 even if ∂nS=∂M40.
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In this appendix, we present an extended model where imitation and FDI are costly. An analysis of the extended model
given in Appendix J is available from the authors upon request. We describe only the parts that are changed in the extended
model. For simplicity, we assume that the R&D and FDI subsidies are equal to zero, that is, sR ¼ sF ¼ 0.
Following Glass and Saggi (2002), we assume that multinational firms need ζð41Þ units of Southern labor to produce
one unit of goods, whereas Southern imitator firms need only one unit of Southern labor. In this case, the marginal cost for
the multinational firms is ζ, although their optimal price is the same as in the original model, pF ðtÞ ¼ λ. Thus, the profits of a
multinational firm change to πF ðtÞ ¼ ð1ζ=λÞEðtÞ. On the other hand, to maximize profits, Southern imitator firms charge a
price so that the multinational firms cannot earn a positive profit; pSðtÞ ¼ ζ. Therefore, the profits of a Southern imitator
become πSðtÞ ¼ ð11=ζÞEðtÞ.
In this model, we assume that imitation activities require labor inputs in contrast to the original model. If a Southern
follower firm devotes amMðtÞ dt units of Southern labor to copy the current latest generation of good j that the multinational
firm produces, the firm succeeds in imitating the good with probabilityMðtÞ dt. Under this setting, we can interpret stronger
IPR protection in the South as an increase in am. Given the value of am, a Southern follower firm attempting to copy a good
chooses M(t) optimally. Therefore, “imitation intensity” M(t) is endogenously determined in this extended model, whereas
the imitation rate is constant and exogenous in the original model. Letting vS(t) denote the value of a Southern imitator firm,
the equilibrium condition of imitation is given by
vSðtÞ ¼ am: ð43Þ
The shareholders of a Southern imitator firm earn dividends πSðtÞ dt and capital gains _vSðtÞ dt, and face a capital loss of
amount vS(t) with probability ιNðtÞ dt over a time interval dt. Therefore, the no-arbitrage condition between the shares of a
Southern imitator firm and the risk-free asset is
rðtÞvSðtÞ ¼ πSðtÞþ _vSðtÞ ιNðtÞvSðtÞ: ð44Þ
As another extension, we assume that FDI is also costly and requires labor inputs in this extended model, whereas we abstract
the FDI cost in the original model. More concretely, we assume that the success or failure of FDI also follows a Poisson process: if
a Northern leader devotes aF ιF ðtÞ dt units of Southern labor to adaptation of technology, it succeeds in shifting production of its
good to the South with probability ιF ðtÞ dt. Under this assumption, the equilibrium condition of FDI changes from (8) to
vNðtÞþaF ¼ vF ðtÞ: ð45Þ
Next, we consider the labor market-equilibrium conditions. In contrast with the original model, a multinational firm
needs ζ units of labor for the production of one unit of the good. This implies that the aggregate labor demand of the
multinational firms changes to nF ðtÞðEðtÞ=λÞζ. The aggregate labor demand of the imitator firms also changes to nSðtÞEðtÞ=ζ
because the price set by the imitator firms is ζ in this model. In addition, Southern labor is devoted to both imitation
activities and FDI. Therefore, the labor market-clearing condition in the South changes from (12) to
aF ιF tð ÞnN tð ÞþamM tð ÞnF tð ÞþnF tð Þ
EðtÞ
λ
ζþnS tð Þ
EðtÞ
ζ
¼ LS: ð46Þ
The labor market-clearing condition in the North is the same as (13).
Finally, we describe the law of motion governing the measures of the industries belonging to each category. In an
infinitesimal time interval of length dt, leader firms succeed in developing a newer generation of ιNðtÞnSðtÞ dt goods and
transferring production of ιF ðtÞnNðtÞ dt type-N goods to the South. Moreover, the imitator firms succeed in copying
MðtÞnF ðtÞ dt type-F goods in the same time interval. Therefore, the measure of the industries where the Southern imitator
monopolistically produces the good changes over time with the following law of motion:
_nSðtÞ ¼MðtÞnF ðtÞ ιðtÞ; ð47Þ
where ιðtÞ  ιNðtÞnSðtÞ. Meanwhile, the law of motion of nNðtÞ is given by
_nNðtÞ ¼ ιðtÞ ιF ðtÞnNðtÞ: ð48Þ
Appendix G–J. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.
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